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THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW. By Christopher Wolfe.

New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1986. Pp. x, 392. $24.95.
Has the contemporary Supreme Court exceeded its constitutional
powers? Are recent decisions made in the guise of judicial review actually manifestations of an activist jurisprudence? Has the Court encroached upon legislative territory?
Christopher Wolfe 1 answers these questions affirmatively in The
Rise of Modern Judicial Review. He traces the Court's changing jurisprudential approach from the early and limited exercise of judicial review Chief Justice John Marshall enunciated in Marbury v. Madison 2
to the far-reaching holdings of the Warren and Burger courts. Wolfe's
thesis is that the once "distinctively judicial power" of the early Court
"has become merely another variant of legislative power" (p. 3). He
contends that successive Courts have seen fewer and fewer definite
constraints in the Constitution's language and context; the Justices instead have seen the document more as a collection of " 'presumptions'
based on supposedly vague general principles" (p. 327). This modem
approach requires numerous "balancing tests" to determine whether
the "countervailing principles at stake" in any individual case may
rebut these presumptions (p. 327).
The Rise of Modern Judicial Review begins by considering the limited role of judicial review immediately after the adoption of the Con-

1. Associate Professor of Political Science at Marquette University.
2. S U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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stitution. Wolfe argues that at that time the rules for interpretation
were "so generally agreed upon that they were ... taken for granted"
(p. 17). Wolfe reads Sir William Blackstone and The Federalist to
state that the interpretive model accepted at the time of the early constitutional debates placed primary emphasis upon the words of the
document. 3 Ambiguity was resolved through consideration of the language in the context of "the whole document and its parts."4
The incorporation of the concept of "moderate" judicial review
into this traditional, literal, and contextual model of interpretation
was accomplished, according to Wolfe, through adherence to three
critical concepts: the "inherent limits of judicial power, legislative deference, and the political questions doctrine" (p. 101). The first concept, "inherent limits," restrained judges' individual wills, favoring
instead reliance upon their judgment as to a law's constitutionality.
Their perceptions of wisdom and social desirability were to be placed
aside. The second critical concept, legislative deference, proscribed judicial review in ambiguous cases. Deferential judges recognized that
"a decent respect [is] due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body ... to presume in favor of [a law's] validity,
until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond reasonable
doubt." 5 Finally, the political questions doctrine eschewed any application ofjudical review to "discretionary acts of other branches," such
as the presidential appointment and foreign affairs powers (p. 106).
Wolfe integrates these three guiding principles of constitutional interpretation into a stringent limitation on judicial review.
John Marshall, Wolfe argues, based his theory of judicial review
upon these three concepts. Marshall's process of interpretation relied
upon his "effecting not his own will but the will of the law: the Constitution" (p. 41); he perceived the Constitution as an agglomeration of
''fundamental principles that look to the distant future and not
merely the moment" (p. 45; emphasis in original). Wolfe writes that
for Marshall, constitutional analysis took on the foundational quality
reflected in his famous admonition that "we must never forget, that it
is a constitution we are expounding." 6 For Marshall and his immediate successors, judicial review meant solely "the power to strike down
laws that clearly violate the Constitution"7 - laws whose effects indu3. See pp. 20-24. This interpretive model is particularly evident in THE FEDERALIST Nos. 33
and 83 (A. Hamilton).
4. P. 24. The debates raged within a common view of interpretation. For example, in the
debate over the National Bank, Madison and Hamilton arrived at opposite conclusions while
agreeing on the "rules of interpretation." P. 25.
5. Pp. 104-05 (quoting Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827)).
6. P. 45 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in
original)).
7. P. 77 (emphasis added). Wolfe develops this language from THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78
and 81 (A. Hamilton).
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bitably are to crack the foundation's cement. In brief, Wolfe argues
that Marshallianjudicial review does not give Justices carte blanche to
choose between various reasonable interpretations.
This conception of judicial review, says Wolfe, did not last; the
"balance of our 'balanced republic' " was not maintained. 8 Instead
the federal judiciary began its slow but unquestionable evolution toward the present day's nearly unrestrained judicial activism.
Wolfe characterizes this "transitional era" as the period during
which the Court's jurisprudence foreshadowed the emergence of the
modem Court while retaining a theoretical commitment to Marshallian traditional values. This period ran from the final quarter of the
nineteenth century through the demise of economic substantive due
process. Wolfe argues that the Roosevelt court-packing plan catapulted the Court into its fully modem form.
Of pivotal importance in the transitional process, Wolfe argues,
was the passage of the fourteenth amendment. Its passage increased
federal power over the states, and its three key provisions - privileges
and immunities, due process, and equal protection - became the vehicles for a broad expansion of judicial power during the subsequent
century (pp. 120, 123). To fortify his view that the fourteenth amendment induced voluminous overexpansion of the judicial power, Wolfe
argues that the ambiguous language and history of the amendment
defy resolution. The resulting constitutional uncertainty compels
Wolfe to advocate a drastically limited principle of judicial review:
Since the traditional model, he writes, permits judicial review only in
cases presenting clear conflicts between Constitution and statute, ambiglious (and socially controversial) cases ought to remain outside of
the judiciary's province. Wolfe's comparison of this ideal and reality
reveals a "historic irony" of fourteenth amendment jurisprudence (p.
143): the very ambiguities that most certainly ought to have constrained judicial activism have instead been seized upon as opportunities for judges "to 'interpret' the Constitution as they prefer and then
to strike down laws that are incompatible with the preferred
'interpretations' ".9
Building upon this analysis, Wolfe demonstrates the transitional
era's progression - perhaps Wolfe would prefer "regression" - into
the modem mode of constitutional inquiry. He cites the economic
substantive due process decisions as the first great expressions of the
8. P. 116 (quoting J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 419 (1873)).
9. P. 143. Wolfe's treatment of the fourteenth amendment reflects the thoroughness of his
analysis, but it also forces him to distinguish any interpretation that does not fit the "transition"
motif. Other commentators also have found ambiguity in the fourteenth amendment's history.
A convincing argument may be made in favor of a broad reading of the amendment. See, e.g., M.
CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 12-13, 91 (1986), reviewed by Book Notice, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1188 (1987).
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flowering of judicial will and as a destructive salvo in the attack upon
the essential distinction between legislation and adjudication (p. 144).
Although its framers intended the fourteenth amendment due process clause to require fidelity to both the "settled issues and modes of
proceeding" in the common law 10 and to constitutional provisions,
Wolfe contends that they most certainly did not envision the use of
due process as a device for subordinating the legislatures to laissezfaire natural-justice principles (p. 145). In the Lochner era, with due
process invoked to strike down all government acts that "arbitrarily
depriv[ed] people of life, liberty or property," the Court defined "arbitrary" on a case-by-case basis (p. 153). This, for Wolfe, was a blatant
invasion by judicial will, amounting to a system in which judicial determination set the general rules regulating.the community. Moreover, Wolfe postulates, this growth in the legislative bench was
disguised (as it still is today) in the language of traditional judicial
review (p. 154).
The final part of Wolfe's book attempts to bring the history into
perspective by analyzing the contemporary Court and current constitutional jurisprudence. He maintains that the departure from traditional conceptions of judicial review became most complete during the
modem era (after 1937). During this third phase, the focus shifted
away from economic laissez-faire toward notions of equality and individual rights.
The 1937 break with economic substantive due process is frequently considered a defeat of the Court at the hands of the political
branches. Wolfe, however, sees the "switch in time" as a victory for
modem judicial power. The saved Nine subsequently abandoned any
attempt to articulate an " 'intelligible standard,' one of kind rather
than degree," for distinguishing federally regulable economic activities
from those reserved to the states (p. 180). The premises behind the
Lochner era rise of Court power remained intact; the focus merely
shifted from economic regulation to social spheres such as privacy and
civil rights.
Wolfe quotes Woodrow Wilson for the modem proposition that
the Constitution, an elastic and adaptable document, needs to be altered to meet contemporary exigencies. 11 In this view, the Constitution is no longer seen as a conclusive arbiter of decisions, but instead
as a collection of presumptions in favor of certain policies - presumptions to be balanced against other contemporary values (p. 229). This
10. P. 137 (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 277 (1856)).
11. Pp. 206, 208. Wilson's views on the proper role of the document changed between his
earlier and later works, although the implications for expansive judicial review did not. See W.
WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885); W. WILSON, CoNSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1921); see also Wolfe, Woodrow Wilson: Interpreting the Constitution, 41 REV. OF POL. 121 (1979).
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"balancing," very much a feature of the modern era, signifies the replacement of the traditional qualitative analysis of kinds of power with
a quantitative inquiry into the degree of importance attached to exercises of power.
Wolfe argues that with this departure from qualitative analysis of
concrete provisions, the distinction between constitutional interpretation and common law has broken down. 12 Wolfe submits that constitutional law ought not to be judge-made law. Instead, it should be the
result of judicial review applied solely to statutes that are clearly contradictory to the propositions of government envisioned by the founders. In this sense, the current state of affairs reflects "a significant shift
away from the thought of the American founding" (p. 233). Wolfe
finds that the modern Court's "legislating" under extraconstitutional
or extended "rights," such as privacy and equality, forsakes fidelity to
the original intent of the Constitution in favor of "public policy making" (p. 297). Case by case, the Court develops new balancing tests,
then later alters them incrementally in reaction to shifts in Justices'
policy preferences.
It is in his analysis of the modern Court that Wolfe's own values
first become destructive to his anti-judicial activism thesis. He tends
in later chapters to be result-oriented, molding his theory to fit his own
policy ideals. In his consideration of decisions made during the earlier
periods, Wolfe maintains a relatively detached perspective, scrutinizing process rather than outcome. However, in his examination of recent decisions, evidence of his political bias becomes so apparent that
it casts doubt upon his underlying motivation. For example, Wolfe
permits his anti-abortion bias to color his treatment of Roe v. Wade, 13
"the most raw exercise of judicial power since Dred Scott. . . . The
Court imposed its own approbation of abortion on the nation at large"
(p. 307). Although Wolfe's observations on the extent to which Roe
represents unrestrained judicial review supports his thesis, the damnatory quality of his disagreement on the merits overshadows whatever
theoretical merit these observations might have.14
12. Justice Cardozo's views support this changed view entirely. See B. CARDOZO, Lecture
/IL The Method of Sociology. The Judge as a Legislator, in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 98 (1921). He does, however, warn against permitting a jurisprudence to exist without
being "constantly brought into relation to objective or external standards" lest it degenerate into
" 'Die Gefiih/sjurisprudenz,' a jurisprudence of mere sentiment or feeling." Id. at 106.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. Most disappointing on this score is a footnote critical of Jesse Choper's blessing of the
abortion decision: "Law school professors are typical of intelligent elites who strongly support
abortion. Perhaps this is so because it takes considerable intellectual skill to 'show' that a fetus
conceived by a man and woman is not a separate 'human' being, but only 'part of a woman's
body.'" P. 342 n.21 (criticizing J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE NATIONAL POLITICAL
PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980)),
Wolfe impeaches Choper by charging that Choper assumes that "generally liberal decisions are
good and conservative ones are bad.'' P. 342. Here Wolfe makes the identical error, merely
reversing the political stance.
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In his conclusion, Wolfe, in an interesting aside, considers the theories of Ronald Dworkin, John Hart Ely, and Jesse Choper. Wolfe
critiques both Dworkin's expansive role for the constitutional judgets
and Ely's elusive middle ground between "narrow clause-based interpretivism" and unrestrained judicial review. 16 Wolfe finds each theory
too permissive; their presentation serves to strengthen the reader's understanding of Wolfe's own commitment to the most restrained
position.
Wolfe's book is useful primarily as a history of the changing notion
of judicial review and the extent to which the process has been one of
accretion, with the emergence of the legislative judiciary occurring
largely under a cloak of fidelity to Marshall's original perception of the
Court as constitutional watchdog. Wolfe's advocacy of a return to a
more limited role for the judiciary is weakened only when the approach becomes result-oriented in the later chapters. But his thesis is
well-pondered and well-documented, and it achieves its goal ofleaving
the reader wondering whether the contemporary Court ought to "legislate" its way into provinces where John Marshall never would have
dared to lead it.
-

Ward A. Greenberg

15. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 132-33 (1977). Dworkin's "liberal theory of law" defends the constitutional philosophy of the Warren Court using what is closer to a
vague generalities interpretation of constitutional provisions.
16. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).

